| They are willing to sacrifice private gain to reward pro-social behaviors and to punish free riders Clark and Sefton 2001. Francis 1985 reports that striking workers take actions to isolate strike breakers that cross the picket line. 2004 show that the self-inter est to reduce network congestion could sustain a peer-to-peer network in the presence of free riders. Gu. career opportunities Hann Louis Vuitton al. and S. The finding sheds new light on the dynamic of 28 peer-to-peer networks and their users. Who??s Louis vuitton uk sharing? Effects of social and expert status on knowledge exchange within groups. Coulson.. Falking et al 2002 . M. a contributor ca nnot punish an individual free rider. 2008. Boyd. The discussion suggests that self-interests ma nifest as a moderating effect between wait time and download needs on individuals?? propensity for contribution. Raghu 2004 . Espinosa. M. to recognize frequent contribution. 2004. Espinosa. This social enforcement mechanism provides an important tool to punish free riders and reward contributors.. Spain. Kandori 1992 suggests that private contributi ons can be maintained among self-interest indi viduals if ??not only are deviators from the desired behavior punished. Raghu 2004 . We therefore hypothesize that an individual??s contribution probability increases with experience in the peer-to-peer network. We therefore hypothesize that an individual??s contribution probability increases with experience in the peer-to-peer network. Thaler. J. Intrinsic factors refer to the satisfaction obtained from the action of creating contents and contributing to social networks such as fun and joy in solving challenges Shah 2006. Sproull. Raghu 2004 . Bowles. little is known about how these mltiple music files in a given day. Of all network users. Indirect reciprocity arises in such a case when individuals respond in kind to a third-party or to the network in general. The assumption. 2004. 2006 categorize the motivations into intrinsic. R. G. Positive reciprocity could lead to a chain effect that dramatically increases contribution to the network while negative reciprocity could quickly doom the network. An individual.. The kindness of strangers: The usefulness of electronic weak ties for technical advice. A. network users are less likely to reciprocat e with music files. As an individual gains experience with the network. K. to recognize frequent contribution. Smith. Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity. S. Table 4 reports individual co ntributors?? enforcement of social norms to encourage indirect reciprocity in the peer-to-peer Louis Vuitton Outlet H3: Experience?C a user??s probability of contribution increases with her experience with the peer-to-peer network.g. An individual. Users that obtain a specific title from a peer-to-peer network are likely to be more concerned about the long-term sustai nability of the network as the valu e of their reputation depends on the survival of the network. and moreover. and use value Shah 2006. Tang. Han. Stallaert. about 3% are pure contributors who never download from the network and a nother 9% are mixed contributors who both contribute files to and download files from the network. 2008. The estimation models also control for time effect and fixed effect for i ndividual heterogeneity. B.. J. Stallaert. most prior studies use cross-sectional datasets and surveys to analyze differences in contribution levels across individuals and the relationship of contribution levels 4 with individual motivations. and Rao H. Most of motivation mechanisms are derived based on the assumption that individuals are self-interested economic decision makers. We find that free ri ders have a significantly negativ e impact on Louis Vuitton UK individual??s contribution H1b . H. R.D. Available at ssrn abstract=926915. E. We control for such individual heteroge neity using a fixed effect model. we are able to identify the inner working of social enforcement in the network. J. Smith. et c. we do not observe individuals?? motivation in making contribution to the peer-to-pe er networks. The increase is consistent with the finding from economic experiments and Figure 1. J. IEEE Computer 34 4 1-8. computer proficiency. Management Science 47 9 1203-1219.. P. We also find that. Similarly. does not require obtaining benef its directly from the recipients. which in turn affects their neighbors. and cooperation. Our analysis also reveals that users in the peer-to-peer network learn about Louis vuitton value and influence of the reward and punishment mech anism over time. Sproull. Journal of Business 59 4 S285?CS300. 2001a. A. S. contributors who both contribute to and download from the peer-to-peer network H1a . In Louis Vuitton Outlet context of peer-to-peer sharing networks. Gummadi. |