| J. and S. However. J. Rao. Johnson. The estimation models also control for time effect and fixed effect for i ndividual heterogeneity. The table shows that the correlations among most variables are small except for the correlation between number of free riders and number of mixed c ontributors. Fehr. Table 3 reports the social influence of indirect reciprocity on the individual c ontribution.g. and team performance Louis Vuitton Official geographically distributed software development. H4: Reputational incentives - A user??s probability of contribution increases after she receives special title in recognition Louis vuitton uk her contribution activities. 2008 . Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for the key variables. Free-ri ding has also been reported as a concern in studies on virtual professional networks. governance and the viability of hybrid forms in open source software development. Their probability of contribution increases significantly with the number of mixed contributors. P. K. W hy share in peer-to-peer networks? Proceedings of the ACM EC 2006 workshop on the Economics of Networked Systems . I. 2001a.E. H4: Reputational incentives - A user??s probability of contribution increases after she receives special title in recognition of her contribution activities. M. Z. Social exchange theory. and R. 2005. individuals may have different propensity for reci procity and our regression analysis only reveals the behavior of an average individuals.. R. then a decrease in on e individual??s contribu tion would affect her neighbors. Public goods: a survey of expe rimental research. can be returned by a third party other than th e recipient Alexander 1987 . Indirect reciprocity. Another important finding of the paper is that an individual??s probability of contribution increases significantly with her experience with the peer-to-peer network H3 . but not to individual recipient s . Electronic knowledge networks: processes and structure. 2004. and A. While economically motivated responder is expected to accept any positive offe r. Falk. R.. In either case. 2005. D. Finally. its server software allows contributors to punish free riders and reward fellow contributors using server priority setting. H2: In-kind Indirect Reciprocit y ?C a user??s probability of contribution is less influenced by the number of pure contributors than by th e number of mixed contributors in a peer-to-peer network. Extant research has identified a variety of factors that motivate user contributions to online social networks. B. S. a significant number of individual contributors enforce the social norm on others by rewarding contributors and punishing free riders . Krishnan et al. First. Das. Table Louis Vuitton UK Shop reports the social influence of indirect reciprocity on the individual c ontribution. 2008 . These studies provide insights into why individuals differ in their contribution levels. and J. S. 2004. O. individuals may have different propensity for reci procity and our regression analysis only reveals the behavior of an average individuals. Social Exchange Theory: the Two Traditions . B. and T. but also by contributors?? characteristics . and Sen. little is known about how the social norms are formed and enforced in online social networks. Annual Reviews in Sociology 2 3 335-362. 2006. The dynamic between an individual and her social environment plays an important role in social networks. Bapna. Oosterbeek. laboratory experiments shows that the responder frequently rejects positive offers if she is offered much less than 50% Oosterbeek et 10 al. The proposer offers a share of the asset to the responder and responder decides whether to accept or reject the offer. S. extrinsic. D. 2005. 2008 INFORMS Annual Meeting INFORMS 08 and 2008 International Conference on Information Systems ICIS 08 for valuable insights and suggestions.. Louis Vuitton UK Sproull. D. reciprocity Wasko and Faraj 2005. 2000. However. Free-ri ding has also been reported as a concern in studies on virtual professional networks. Nature 432 7016 499-502. B. Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. E. Jayaraman. they observe others?? actions in a social network and adjust their behavior accordingl y Bapna et al 2004 . Information Systems Research 18 1 42-67. S. The de lay from congestion and the associated opportunity costs are one of the main costs incurred by individuals downloading files in such networks. 2008 . and S. Sigmund. Shah 2006. It is what one does: why people pa rticipate and help others in electronic communities of practice. 2007. while in a public goods game with peer punishment individuals?? contribution levels gradually Louis vuitton to a higher equilibrium level. we propose: H9: Experience ?C a contributor??s probability of providing priority services to other contributors increases w ith her experience with the peer-to-peer network. and reducti on of network congestion in file sharing networks Louis Vuitton Outlet Official et al.. are free riders. extrinsic. |