| IROM-06-09 Indirect Reciprocity in Online Social Networks ?C A Longitudinal Analysis of Individual Contributions and Peer Enforcement in a Peer-to-Peer Music Sharing Network Bin Gu McCombs School of Business We thank Andres Hervas-Dra ne. Prior studies note that stability in so cial networks is of ten achieved through so cial norms Kandori 1992 . these experiments discover that individuals Louis Vuitton Outlet UK social norms on each other. R. and moreover. panel data enables us to control for individual heterogeneity. P. S. ??platinum member??. which enable them to respond in Louis vuitton uk to each other. Public Choice 86 1-2 117-135. and organizational climate. influence an indi vidual??s propensity to contribut e to the network. Figure 1: Comparison of contribution level in repeated public good game without punishment mechanism against contribution level with punishment mechanis m obtained from Fehr and Gachter 2000b. Other Drivers for Contributions Besides concerns for indirect reciprocity. The need for using such a reward and punishment mechanism is at the greatest when the network is overwhelmed with free riders and at the lowest when the network has a sufficient number of contributors. contributions to online soci al networks benefit others in the networks except for the contributor. followed by a discussion of the empirical analysis and results. M. e. then a decrease in on e individual??s contribu tion would affect her neighbors. sequential prisoner??s dilemma games. However. K. For example. B. Panchanathan. The experimenter then triples the amount sent and the responder is free to return anything between zero and the amount to the proposer. we consider our study complements to earlier studies that focus on identifying individual motivations but overlook th e dynamic nature of social networks. 2003. Due to data limitations. due to data limitations. Positive reciprocity could lead to a chain effect that dramatically increases contribution to the network while negative reciprocity could quickly doom the network. S. the analysis above indicates that indirect reciprocity is an important dynamic social force in peer-to-peer networks. M. suggesting that individuals become more reciprocal over time in social environments with punishment mechanisms. Familiarity. which provide incentives to network users to become free-riders in the network. INFORMS Journal on Computing 20 1 100-111. A. Information Systems Research 18 1 42-67. Y. S. in particular. Information Systems Research 15 2 155-174. and a comment on suicide terrorism. 2004 find that 42% of users of Gnutella. The notion that individuals have incentive to punish non-cooperators in a social setting has been long observed in human so cieties. The Biology of Moral Systems. Fehr. 1974. 1998. S. a user can easily determine the c ooperative environment in the network by observing the sharing level of other network users. individuals in the networks will have less incen tive to reciprocate. J. Public Choice 86 1-2 117-135. To develop an empirical hypothesis from the self-interest theory. Collective action and the evolution of social norms. there are few repeated direct interactions Louis Vuitton UK the participants. howev er. due to data limitations. While direct reciprocity often prevails in direct one-to-one economic exchanges. First. The labeling of frequent contribut ors plays a significant role for sustaining cooperation in the networks. Jessup. free riders could flourish. We find that an individual??s likelihood of contributions increases with the number of contri butors in the peer-to-p eer network but decreases with the number of free riders in the network. indicating that the multicollinearity problem is not severe e nough to affect the regression results. The dynamic between an individual and her social environment plays an important role in social networks. etc. 2005. However. B. References Alexander. P. Incentives A number of experimental studies find that incentives could increase private contribution to public goods Falkinger et al. The de lay from congestion and the associated opportunity costs are one of the main costs incurred by individuals downloading files in such networks. Collective action and the evolution of social norms. H4: Reputational incentives - A user??s probability of contribution increases after she receives special title in recognition of her contribution activities. and team performance in geographically distributed software development. Xia. E. E. E. due to data limitations. J. 2006.330 users?? activities in a peer-to-peer network over 121 days. Our analysis also reveals that reputation and social enforcement have Louis vuitton handbags uk influences on an individual contribution probability H4 and H5 . 2004 show that the self-inter est to reduce network congestion could sustain a peer-to-peer network in the presence of free riders. A series of economic experiments conducted by Fehr and Gachter 2000b s how that contributors are willing to punish free riders ev en if ??the punishment is costly for them and even if they cannot expect future benefits fr om their punishment activities??. we e xpect network users to learn over time that contribution provides many benefits over free-r iding. Emerson 1976 . Susarla. Behavioral intention formation in knowledge sharing: Examining the roles of extrinsic motivators. Second. Electronic knowledge networks: processes and structure. Management Science 52 7 984-999. S. We render this important question for future studies. When the individual has highe r download needs. Gintis. individuals in the networks will have less incen tive to reciprocate. 2004 show that the Louis vuitton est to reduce network congestion could sustain a peer-to-peer network in the presence of free riders. Proceedings of National Academy of Science 102 7 2666-2670. On the other hand. J. In a ddition. Indirect reciprocity. 2007b. J. 2008 INFORMS Annual Meeting INFORMS 08 and 2008 International Conference on Information Louis Vuitton Cheap ICIS 08 for valuable insights and suggestions. |