| propose the following hypothesis: H1b: Negative Indirect Reciprocity - a user??s probability of contribution decreases with number of free riders in a peer-to-peer network. and to which user group to contribute. The labeling of frequent contribut ors plays a significant role for sustaining cooperation in the networks. A. The assumption. The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment. Experimental Economics 7 2 171?C188. Preferential attach ment and mutuality in electronic knowledge networks. Stallaert. Smith. Another important finding of the paper is that louis vuitton outlet individual??s probability of contribution increases significantly with her experience with the peer-to-peer network H3 . NY. 2004. the action of contributing often incurs significant costs for the contributor. Louis Vuitton UK Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for the key variables. Stallaert. L. Management Science 49 3 464?C477. Controlling for individual heterogeneity isolates social influences from individual motivations. indicating that the multicollinearity problem is not severe e nough to affect the regression results. While private contribution of public goods deprives the contributor the use or service of the contributed good. Sobel. To Keep Sharing Or Not To Keep Sharing? -- An Empirical Analysis On User Decision In Peer-to-peer Sharing Networks. Y. charity giving or because contributors prefer reciprocation in other kinds e. the individual will have no incentive to contribute if she has no download needs or there is no congestion in the network. Levati. Casadesus-Masanell. J. 2003. We therefore propose: H6: Congestion - A user??s probability of cont ribution increases with wait time when the user has high download needs. G. Electronic knowledge networks: processes and structure.5:1. virtual investment communities Gu et al. The difference indicates that content contribution to peer-to-p eer networks by itself does not create a conflict between self interest and collective interest as in a typical public good model. Sigmund. 2007. Spain. and S. Of all network users. challenged by the rapid growth of large scale online social networks such as peer-to-peer networks Asv anund et al. starting an avalanche across the network. S. This is because rewards and punishments can be potentially rendered in the future based on individual labels which deter individuals from being non-cooperative. Knetsch. Moreover. we propose: H9: Experience ?C a contributor??s probability of providing priority services to other contributors increases w ith her experience with the peer-to-peer network. the summary statistics reveal that 48% of all contributors use some form of reward and punishment mechanisms by providing better services to other contributors. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 3 817-868. Kiesler. Boyd. We therefore propose: H6: Congestion - A user??s probability of cont ribution increases with wait time when the user has high download needs. Lab experiments show that the ability for individuals to punish free riders and reward contributors has a significant impact on contribution to public goods. Kraut. often called free riders. S. Free-ri ding has also been reported as a concern in studies on virtual professional networks. It is what one does: why people pa rticipate and help others in electronic communities of practice. While reputation mechanisms provide an important tool in such environments. R. we note that the decision of contribution out of self-interests is de termined Louis Vuitton Outlet a trade-off between congestion costs and contribution costs. The summary statistics suggest that. any user that meets the criteria set up by the contributor can download from her. they observe others?? actions in a social network and adjust their behavior accordingl y Bapna et al 2004 .. In a well-known public good experiment conducted by Fehr and Gachter 2000b . 2001. thus reducing free riding behavior and promoting cont ribution. Kahneman. knowledge self-efficacy Kankanhalli 2006. Management Science 49 2 160-178. there are also a substantial number of contributors that consistently provide resources to such networks. Indirect re ciprocity. M. In the context of this research. Management Science 36 6 689?C703. R. Our analysis also reveals that users in the peer-to-peer network learn about the value and influence of the reward and punishment mech anism over time.. The influence of indirect reciprocity reflects in two ways. Reciprocal behavior has l ong been observed in human so ciety Ekeh 1974. 1990. and open-source development communities Hann et al. Hosanagar. and S. Why do users contribute to firm-hosted user communities? The case of computer-controlled music instruments. Our goal is to understand how changes in the envi ronment of the peer-to-peer network influence individuals making contributions to the network and enforcing social norms. Instead. We conduct the analysis using a panel data by observing 103. The percentage is Louis Vuitton than the percentage of all contributors. Familiarity. e. a contributor does not expect in-kind reciprocation from beneficiaries either because beneficiaries cannot afford to e. We therefore propose: H8: Wait ?C a contributor??s probability of providing preferential services to other contributors increases w ith her download wait time. J. and H. 2006. W. IROM-06-09 Indirect Reciprocity in Online Social Networks ?C A Longitudinal Analysis of Individual Contributions and Peer Enforcement in a Peer-to-Peer Music Sharing Network Bin Gu McCombs School of Business We thank Andres Hervas-Dra ne. identity verification. NJ. M. Figure 1: Comparison of contribution level in repeated public good game without punishment mechanism against contribution level with punishment mechanis m obtained from Fehr and Gachter 2000b. For example. and U. governance and the viability of hybrid forms in Louis vuitton uk source software development. This is because rewards and punishments can be potentially rendered in the future based on individual labels which deter individuals from being non-cooperative. In the context of peer-to-peer sharing networks. inaccurate. R. 2 Introduction A noted feature of many social networks is the louis vuitton outlet ratio of purely consuming users. A. G. |